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Abstract   
The  informational  structure,  which  subsists  in  a  game  run,  receives 
specific connotations when particular contexts are analyzed, not only the 
theoretic ones. Under risk, the distorted perception of a situation, by the 
decision makers who are loss averters or by those who care about their 
image, is present especially in the case of probabilities having values 
close to extremes  (low  odds  or  high  odds).  For  instance,  the  children 
or  teenagers often  take  risky actions only as a challenge, in order to 
prove that they are not afraid. The concern for reputation could explain 
a  wide  range  of  behavioral  anomalies.  When  skill  shakes  hands  with 
chance,  the  success  or  failure  changes  the  informational  structure 
related  to  the  decision  maker￿s  behavioral  endowment.  Resuming  the 
main economic  models of  asymmetric  information  within  a  risky context 
is  one  of our goals. The  second  objective  consists  in reviewing  some 
specific  problems  regarding  the  computer  implementation  of  these 
models. 
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1. SOME ECONOMIC MODELS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
There are times when markets fail due to imperfect information.  The first type 
of imperfect information is public incomplete information. We mean that information is 
randomly  insufficient  and  not  manipulated  by  any  agent  in  the  markets,  generating 
inefficient  resource  allocation  and  thus  creating  welfare  losses.  The  second  type  is 
asymmetric information. We talk about asymmetric information when somebody knows 
more than somebody  else.  In  this  case  the  information  is  purposely  incomplete and 
manipulated  by  some  actors.  This  will  result  in  misallocation  of  resources,  causing   
more welfare losses.  Two of the   most well-known asymmetric information problems 
are moral hazard and adverse selection. 
In 1996, the Prize of Bank of Sweden for Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred  Nobel  was  awarded  to  James  Mirrlees  and  William  Vickrey  for  their 
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Constanta, May 2005, Romania fundamental contributions to the theory of incentives under asymmetric information, in particular 
its application to the design of optimal income taxation and resource allocation through different 
types of auctions. In 2001, the same prize was granted to George A. Akerlof, A.  Michael Spence 
and Joseph E. Stiglitz for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information. 
Mirrlees (1974) analysed a one-period static relation Principal-Agent. Holmstrom (1979) 
analysed further Mirrlees￿s case and proved that there is a loss in efficiency in the case in which 
the Agent is risk averse and its actions are not observable. 
Grossman and Hart (1983) continued the  way opened by Mirrlees and Holmstrom by 
analysing the role of information in the model Principal-Agent. Radner (1985) tried a dynamic 
analysis of the model by considering the dynamic model as an infinitely repeated version of the 
static model.  He  demonstrated  that  the  loss  in  efficiency  disappears  under  certain  conditions. 
The payoff scheme is historical-dependent and penalizes the Agent if his outcomes are worse 
than the expected ones in case of optimum actions, but the modeling is forced under conditions 
of a long-term contract. 
Akerlof  (1970)  showed  how  we  could  obtain  adverse  selection  in  the  markets  in 
the  presence  of  informational  asymmetries.  Spence  (1973)  demonstrated  that  informed 
economic agents in such markets  may have incentives to take observable and costly actions to 
credibly signal their private information to  uninformed  agents, so as to improve their  market 
outcome.  Stiglitz  (1974,1981)  showed  that  poorly  informed  agents  can  indirectly  extract 
information  from those  who  are   better  informed,  by   offering   a   menu  of  alternative  
contracts  for  a  specific transaction, so-called screening through self-selection. 
The Principal-Agent literature has found that a concern for skill reputation can explain 
a wide range of anomalous behavior from herding to the sunk cost fallacy. The idea that a rational 
concern  for skill  reputation  can  induce  irrational  behavior  has  a  long history  starting  with 
Holmstrom (1982). Harbaugh (2003) show that the standard Principal-Agent model can be also 
extended to analyse the phenomenon of probability weighting. 
The  behavior  of  agents  will  vary  depending  on  the  information  available  to  the 
parties, the  beliefs  of  observers  and  the  type  of  skill that  is  being  evaluated.  A  concern 
for  skill reputation leads to behavior that is consistent with large weights on low probabilities 
relative  to  high probabilities.  If  the  decision  maker  varies  in  his  ability  to  evaluate  the 
probability  of success of a risky endeavour, his behavior is consistent with overweighting of 
low  probabilities  and  underweighting  of  high  probabilities,  a  pattern  predicted  by  prospect 
theory. 
Behavior  in  information-based  models  is  generally  less  predictable  than  in 
psychological models  because  information  flows  in  social  environments  are  difficult  to  
fully  monitor  or control. 
All these represent  only  the  beginning  of the study  of  the problems  of  informational 
asymmetry. We keep in mind that if two economic agents shall do a business together and they 
are in  the  presence  of  asymmetrical  information  then  their  incentives are  deformed  and  it  is 
entered an important inefficiency. 
 
2. SOME PROBLEMS REGARDING COMPUTER IMPLEMENTATION 
A  game  is  a  synergetic  collection  of  several  types  of  objects  that  interact  among 
them. Thus,  time  and  its  lapse,  states  of  the  world,  allowed  changes  to  other  states  of  the 
world, visiting  rules,  causality,  areas  with  lack  of  complete  information,  the  moment  of 
decision- making,  possible  actions,  dictatorial  rules,  the  beginning  and  the  potential  ends, 
history    of  movements,    future  evolution,  path  rules,  utility  function,  rational  players, 
irrational  players, memory  of  the  players,  rules  about  the  type  of  players,  player￿s  payoff, 
player￿s  strategy, player￿s  beliefs,  behavior  rules,  individualism  and  cooperation,  coalitions￿ 
rules,  equivalent games and main goal of the game are basic parts in game construction. But, 
only the complete structure must be taken into account.  
The main forms of game  representation (normal or extensive form) enjoy the property 
that they are manipulabile by computer using proper data structures. All these forms are specific 
to the standard model for human behavior in economics. It is the context where the individuals 
maximize their own utilities subject to a set of constraints. But there are anomalistic behaviors 
(Gintis,  2000)  of  Homo  economicus  like  Homo  equalis,  Homo  reciprocans   and  
Homo parochius.  By  its  consequences,  building  of  an  armistice  (the  selection  of  
equilibrium)  is sometimes a real and difficult problem. 
Homo  economicus  is  the  one  who  wants  to  find  the  behavior  that  leads  to  
the maximization of this utility function. The modeling of this behavior brings two problems to 
our attention. 
The  first  depends  on  our  technique  and  ability  to  determine  this  behavior  when  the 
utility functions are known. We said that we look at this problem from a normative viewpoint. 
It is a specific problem  of Optimization Theory. This problem  of Decision Theory  may be a 
problem  of  Linear  or  Nonlinear  Programming,  Calculus  of  Variations, Control  Theory  or 
Stochastic Optimization. We wonder whether we said all. We are in the presence of some solvers 
packages dedicated  to several  narrow  classes  of  problems.  But  how  could  we  recognize  the 
solving  method?  For  example,  to  find  the  bottom  of  a  very  narrow  abyss  that  is  placed 
somewhere  in  a  perfectly  flat  area  may  be  sometimes  crowned  by  success  if  a  genetic 
algorithm is used for instance. Creating an expert system for orientation in this very wide field is 
of real use. 
The second is related to the elicitation of the utility function that describes as accurate 
as possible  the  behavior  of  an  agent  given  a  certain  context.  We  say  that  we  look  at  the 
problem from  a  descriptive  viewpoint,  and  after  twenty-five  years  of  research,  the  prospect  
theory  remains  the  best  descriptive  model.  The  cumulative  prospect  theory  (Tversky  and 
Kahneman, 1992)  uses  the same  basic  principles  as  the  original theory, the  major  technique 
innovation being the use of a rank-dependent functional with a view to extending the prospect 
theory to an arbitrary number of consequences, as well as under risk and uncertainty. In the case 
of  risk,  the  gains  and  losses  of  a  prospect  were  applied  separate  rank-dependent 
transformations.  As  to  the uncertainty,  the  cumulative  prospect  theory  used  a  special  model 
called  the  Choquet  expected utility.  The  particular  form  of  the  weighting  function  explains 
the  violations  of  the  expected  utility  theory.  Resuming,  the  problem  of  eliciting  the  utility 
function  with  high accuracy in  real time  faces  us  with  a balance  (or a  dilemma!)  as  a  high 
accuracy requires a significant period of time and to spend some resources as well. Even in the 
simplest  case,  where  the  utility  function  depends  only  on  the  monetary  consequences,  its 
elicitation  is  solved  by  approximating  from  a  given  class  of  utility  functions  (trade-off, 
Bleichrodt-Pinto, Abdellaoui). This is the reason why multicriterial decision algorithms (which 
avoid its elicitation) become valuable. In this respect, we could take AHP (Saaty, 1977) as an 
example.  And  when  to breathe  freely,  we  discover  two alternatives  to   yield  an  outcome,  
depending  on  what  we  want,  either  its  suitability  or  its optimality. 
We have not done anything else but to review the problems related to the modeling of 
one of the basic elements of a game. All the elements of the game have the same importance, but 
the problems of implementation modeling are specific to each one.  Even  in  the  case  (trivial 
apparently) of modeling the time and its lapse, for instance, a problem occurs in determining the 
relation  between  hyperreals  numbers  and  numbers  used  in  its  computer  representation,  that 
might not be a negligible element for a differential game. 
Not only the basic elements of game can give us problems. Let's talk about reputation. In  the  classical  theory  of  social  choice  a  set  of  agents  is  called  to  rank  a  set  of 
alternatives.  Arrow￿s    impossibility    theorem    (Arrow    1963)    shows    that    there    is    no  
aggregation  rule  that satisfies  some  minimal  requirements,  while  by  relaxing  any  of  these 
requirements appropriate social aggregation rules can be defined. Given the agents￿ individual 
rankings, a social ranking of the alternatives is generated. 
Reputation systems introduce a new social choice model. When the set of agents and 
the set  of  alternatives  coincide,  we  get  the so-called  reputation  systems  setting.  The  input  is  
a reputation graph. Agents are ranked based on other agents￿ reports on their quality of 
service, behavior, or importance. We consider three basic postulates for reputation systems: 
Generality: The social ranking should be defined for any reputation graph. 
Transitivity:  If  the  set  of agents  that  provide  positive  (resp.  negative)  feedback  on 
agent a is more important (resp. more reliable) than the set of agents that provide positive (resp. 
negative) feedback on agent b then agent a should be ranked higher (resp. lower) than agent b. 
Weak Monotonicity: If the set of agents that provide positive (resp. negative) feedback on 
agent a is not more important (resp. not more reliable) than the set of agents that provide 
positive (resp.negative) feedback on agent b, and a is ranked socially higher (resp. socially 
lower) than b, then there should be at least one agent who provides positive (resp. negative) 
feedback on a which is more important (resp.  more reliable)  than at least one  agent who 
provides positive (resp. negative) feedback on b. 
It is impossible to satisfy all 3 postulates for reputation systems settings with positive 
and negative  feedbacks.  Relaxing  any  of  these  postulates  will  allow generating  appropriate 
social rankings  (Tennenholtz, 2004).  This  result  doesn￿t  make  less  valuable  the  famous 
types  of reputation system that include page ranking in the context of search engines and traders 
ranking in the context of e-commerce. It is easy to use like a black box the reputation. See by 
example the  building  of  reputational mechanism  in  credible  government policies  (Ljungqvist, 
Sargent, 2000). But reputation may be a bomb. We know nothing about the reputation proprieties. 
We underline just three thinks: the game's  complexity, adequate accuracy of 
modeling, working limitation. 
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By  using  three  fundamental  hypotheses, 
namely   the    knowledge    of    rules,    the 
rationality of participants  and the fact that 
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participants  (players).  The  experience  is 
accumulated  by  studying  real  competitive 
situations occurred during the time, as well 
as by studying mathematical models which 
define a hypothetical competitive situation. 
But, the software support is not present in 
all subjects￿ areas of interest. What  do  we  mean  by informational  asymmetry?  Before  receiving  an  answer,  another 
question must get an answer, that is: what is the additional information that someone possesses 
in  comparison  with  another  person?  The  classic  examples  show  us  that  this  supplementary 
information  may  be  packed  into  ￿type  of  player￿  and  manipulated  without  affecting  the 
framework of game. Is this framework appropriate for explaining the confrontation between the 
two parties in September 11, 2001? We face an extreme case, in which one part saw a position 
in the game tree and the other part did not. We have a new type of informational asymmetry. 
The future real problems, already prefiguring to horizon, will be not only military, as a way to 
take possession of some resources, but particularly socio-economic issues seen from the point of 
view of some specific beliefs. Belief is one of the basic elements of a game. How will the game 
solving  look  when  the  basic  element  of  the  informational  asymmetry  is  the  succession  of 
changes in beliefs? If the study of classic examples was initiated in the seventh decade of the 
last century and we could not tell that we know all, what would be the prospects for the solving 
of these problems of informational asymmetry to be known? Who knows? It is certain that the 
informational  asymmetry, as  referred,  is  no  longer  capable  to  model  and describe  the severe 
confrontations in the world of the beginning of the third millennium. 
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